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In essence, Corporate Governance (CG), both as a practice and as a public 
corporate   philosophy,   represents   good   business   practice   from   a   financial 
perspective. In CLSA’s survey of large-cap companies across emerging markets (a 
total of 495 companies those from including 11 Asian markets with a combined 
total of 34 companies from Hong Kong and 47 companies from Malaysia), the total 
average US$ return over the past five years has been 388% while the top CG 
quartile providing an average return of 930%. 
1
1  All statistical data is drawn from the CLSA annual reviews of Corporate Governance in Asia 
(2001-2007). Patterns described in this study have been cross-referenced to the McKinsey study on 
CG (2000) and with interviews of corporate officers in Malaysia and Hong Kong. 
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Abstract
Corporate Governance (CG) has been viewed by many in the Western world 
as a particularly Western concept and mechanism. Current expectations by executive 
management groups of their Board run the gamut of “sober second thought” and 
conservative oversight focused on compliance issues, through involvement in strategy 
development   and   direction,   to   daily   consultation   on   operational   strategy 
implementation. The challenge along all points of this spectrum is the balance between 
independence and discipline on the one hand and self-interests of the Board members 
in the overall success of the corporation, from both a financial and an ego perspective.
This article outlines key findings resulting from focused interviews and in-
depth reviews of research related to the practice of corporate governance in Asia. 
Interviews were conducted in Hong Kong (6) and Malaysia (12) and focused on CG in 
those two countries. The goal was to establish areas of consistency or divergence from 
findings in the interviews. Findings indicate that CG continues to struggle in areas of 
transparency and limited independence of Board members. Increased legislation in the 
focal countries studied (Malaysia and Hong Kong) has helped, but progress has been 
slow.In ten of the 11 Asian markets, including both Hong Kong and Malaysia 
but excluding Korea, companies in the top quartile for CG averaged 10 percentage 
points above their respective country averages in higher ROE. Similar correlations 
were found between ROCEs and CG performance.
Across Asian markets, stocks or companies at the top end for CG have 
been strong outperformers over the past one to five years. Companies in this group 
showed 54% above their market average. This contrasts with those companies in 
the lowest two CG quartiles whose stocks listed at 43% lower than the market 
average. 
The tradition of the family run business in Asia represents a difficulty for 
evolving positive CG practice. Across Asia, 60% of market capitalization of 
companies is based on single shareholder domination (owning < 20% of the 
company).   Under  such  a   model,   there  is  strong   resistance   to   transparence, 
independence of Board, external accountability, and fairness to investors other than 
family. Traditional practice of the family-owned business nature represents a 
limiting factor in the short term to modern CG practice in both Hong Kong and 
Malaysia where the “primary founder as prime  stockholder” still dominates 
business practice.
Privately held businesses comprise by far the majority of companies across 
Asia. In Hong Kong, for example, such companies, when put together with 
unincorporated businesses, represent about 99% of all business entities both 
incorporated and unincorporated. They contribute roughly 40% to HK’s GDP and 
employ about 60% of the work force (Jones, 2001). Similar proportions accrue in 
Malaysia. Consequently, legislation and enforcement efforts that are currently 
confined to listed companies cover a very small fraction of Asian companies. 
Efforts to improve CG practice will necessarily have to explore avenues to 
encourage non-listed company participation.
The patterns for companies in which CG was not a priority indicate as 
willingness to mix Board membership with management responsibility (the same 
individuals sitting on both Board and management committee), a willingness not to 
control manager, executive or Board member actions through application of strict 
policy related to business ethics in its broadest sense, and a willingness to ignore 
the valid stated interests of minority shareholders and/or other stakeholders. 
Misstatement of numbers in the annual or other filed reports is a typical example of 
such practice. 
The largest companies reviewed had much higher CG scores (see statement 
related to potential research bias outlined in Footnote 1). In the initial CLSA study 
in 1999 average overall CG score for the top 10% of companies by market cap was 
71.8%, in effect 28% higher than the average CG score for the overall sample. In 
2004, the same score was 75% and in 2005 it was 70%. Companies included in this 
group from Hong Kong include HSBC, Li & Fung, CLP, Cathay Pacific, Hong 
Kong Gas. No companies from Malaysia were in this top-ten large-cap group. In 
1999 the first Malaysian company in the listing was BAT, in 19
th  place, with 
Malaysia’s overall country score having dropped from 60% to 56% in 2005.
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relative ranking of companies (see Appendix A for an amalgam of criteria used by 
various studies to evaluate CG), the conclusion that good CG equates with superior 
performance and companies with low CG underperform is valid. Across all studies 
this outcome was verified.
One of the key reasons for underperformance for companies lacking good 
CG is that investors – particularly institutional investors – are now more wary of 
stocks of  companies  having perceived  low CG standards.  Loss of investor 
confidence is self-fulfilling, causing reduced stock valuation and a negative spiral 
of overall company financial performance over time.
Study Findings: General Statements about Asian CG
Any review of CG must take into consideration the reality that the macro 
environments within which individual company practices exist have a dramatic and 
telling impact on policy and behavior at the individual company level. Those 
country cultures that support good corporate governance practice will naturally 
result in both underlying philosophical support for strong CG and the development 
and enforcement of regulatory policy concerning CG practice. The CLSA studies 
(CLSA, 2001, 2004, 2005, and 2007) have listed between 5 macro-factors as core 
determinants of the CG characteristics exemplified by companies. These factors 
have been approximated in a variety of studies of international CG practice (Black: 
2001 and McKinsey: 2000). Macro-environmental factors most influential in 





Corporate Governance Macro-Factors Importance*
Clear, transparent, and comprehensive rules and 
regulations
1
Committed and effective enforcement of rules and 
regulations
3
Political and regulatory environment affecting CG and 
ability of corporations to maximize value without 
arbitrary restrictions
2
Adoption of International Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles 2
Institutional mechanisms to promote awareness and a 
culture of good governance 2
*  1= important                      2= very important                    3= extremely important
1 Adapted from CLSA (2001).
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perception of political (and cultural) will to enforce the rules and regulations that 
are “on the books”. As CLSA notes: “Without effective enforcement, corporations 
can and will get away with scandalous behavior.” CLSA, 2001:36).  This opinion 
was strongly reinforced by data gathered in semi-structured interviews at a series 
of international conferences on Corporate Governance starting in 2001 in Malaysia. 
Interviewed participants indicated that, while Malaysia has a well developed and 
codified system for the identification of requisite CG practice, enforcement has 
clearly been ineffective and selective to date. This represents, in their opinion, a 
significant limiting factor in the move in Malaysia to more consistently positive 
CG practices and its international business reputation.
For this reason, the simple existence of positive rules and regulations can 
be seen to represent only a good start in the overall CG journey. It is in and through 
the enforcement of the publicly stated regulations that the actual culture of CG 
becomes obvious in practice and significant from a corporate metric perspective. 
For this reason, on the scale of importance, the history and current culture of 
enforcement must be listed as by far the most significant determinant of any market 
appreciation of a CG premium for both a particular country macro-environment 
and for individual company performance.
In terms of the application of CG in Asia in general, the metaphor of the 
carrot and the stick represents an interesting and useful approach to identifying a 
pattern in emerging practice. Interviewers  consistently  indicated that  the stick 
represented an unavoidable and core component underlying the movement toward 
acceptance and implementation of more acceptable CG practice across Asia and, in 
terms of this current study, in Hong Kong and Malaysia in particular. 
Trends in data generated by both CLSA and McKinsey indicate that those 
companies in both Hong Kong and Malaysia that have adopted more transparent 
and responsive governance practices were also much more likely to have higher 
stock valuations and financial performance rations while those in the bottom 
quartile of performance had much poorer rations without exception. Also without 
exception was the observation that, as enforcement of regulations and public 
punishment of transgressors (the  name and shame  approach) was effectively 
implemented, corporate governance practice increasingly became more positive. 
While some interviewees noted that this was affected by the positive effect on 
financial performance measures, most admitted that the driving motivation for CG 
implementation was the principle of FOG-C (“Fear of getting caught!”). 
This pattern was particularly noticeable in Hong Kong, where a study of 
CG practices with the aim of bringing about radical reform in enforcement is being 
implemented. This initiative in Hong Kong is designed to make poor CG practice 
particularly costly from a legal perspective. In Malaysia, where enforcement is not 
yet well implemented and perceived to be selective in nature, new CG reporting 
regulations   introduced   in   2000   and   reinforced   by   new   securities   listing 
requirements related to CG practice (implementation in the February – June, 2001 
timeframe) have not had a significant impact on the movement toward more 
positive CG practice (CLSA, 2005).
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research studies and published reports, an attempt has been made to document 
trends and examples in both  common practices  as well as  best practices  in 
corporate   governance   in   two   specific   Asian   marketplaces:   Hong   Kong   and 
Malaysia. In Hong Kong, structured interviews were carried out with 6 firms 
directly. Third party data was gathered in relation to an additional 38 firms. In 
Malaysia, structured interviews were carried out with 8 firms, with third party data 
gathered in relation to an additional 47 companies. Third party data focused almost 
entirely on firms in the medium and large cap categories, while interview data 




While Malaysia has a well-developed set of regulations and rules related to 
CG performance areas, it was rated among the lowest in the Region in terms of 
enforcement. Reality is that enforcement has been selective in the past and is 
perceived to be politically determined. Analysis of practice over the recent past 
indicate a clear willingness of the Government and the Judiciary to interfere with 
enforcement. 
Although the Malaysian Code on Best Practices (2000) outlines clear 
regulations related to CG practice and change in listing regulations on the part of 
the KL Securities has forced some formalization of company approaches to 
governance, progress has essentially stagnated currently. The decision to join the 
Independent Directors Register in 2005 may have a more immediate impact on 
publicly listed entities. The new regulations did reinforce a number of “best 
practices” that will be difficult to avoid for companies listed on the KLSE. Among 
the requirements are the following:
· Disclosure related to compliance with principles and best practices of 
Malaysian  Code  of  CG  (compliance  is  voluntary,  but  disclosure  related  to 
compliance is mandatory).
· Loans to third parties and unlisted holding companies no longer 
allowed (avoidance of repetition of Renong Group fiasco and the more recent MAS 
and Proton struggles related to transparency).
· Statement related to state of company’s internal controls.
· One-third of directors must be independent (an accomplishment now 
possible through the membership as noted above in the  Independent Directors 
Registry).
· All directors to attend mandatory training programs on the duties and 
responsibilities of directors and CG in general (courses are currently being offered 
and are heavily subscribed).
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auditors prior to publication.
· Information provided to the Exchange must be clear, unambiguous, 
accurate, not contain any material omission, and not be false or misleading.
· Remuneration of directors to be disclosed in annual report (report by 
bracket of remuneration paid).
· Non-audit fees paid to external auditors to be disclosed in annual report.
· KLSE empowered to enforce against directors and advisers for breaches 
in Listing Requirements.
The above changes represent significant shifts in the formal requirements 
related to CG practice for listed companies. Two limiting factors remain, even in 
the light of these positive shifts:
1) the  number  of listed companies  remains  small  compared  to the 
percentage of business carried on by unlisted and unincorporated business entities. 
These remain unaffected by the requirements.
2) the climate of enforcement (i.e. the political will to enforce) remains 
untested. 
The Government Finance Committee proposed in 1999 that the Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF) should take the lead to organize a minority shareholder 
watchdog group to protect the common small investor and lead a sense of propriety 
to CG practice related to smaller shareholders. Interviewees candidly indicated that 
membership on any such group would be politically and professionally suicidal and 
potentially personally risky. The underlying culture of business in Malaysia as 
currently structured would make  the work of such a group difficult if not 
impossible to implement. 
Malaysian Banks appear to have been granted increasing freedom to base 
loan decisions on business case data rather than political connections. Their recent 
decision not to provide credit to the Vice-Chair of a Malaysian political party for a 
questionable business move indicates increasing concern for transparency of 
decision making in this real of the business environment.
All of the cautionary details noted above notwithstanding, there remains 
the hope for improvement in CG practice for listed companies based on the formal 
reporting requirements at the SC. At a minimum, companies will be encouraged to 
engage in in-depth discussions of significant CG issues. If this development is 
paralleled with sufficient public enforcement activities and the rise in stock 
valuations and financial performance measures that current positive CG practice 
appears to yield, there is the hope for movement in CG practice in the Malaysian 
environment over the next several years. 
Hong Kong
Based on the perception that CG practice in Hong Kong must shift its 
focus toward increased transparency and more positive protection of shareholder 
rights, there appears to be an increased awareness in HK that changes in CG need 
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Monetary Authority (HKMA) to make rules for more stringent CG practice by the 
HK banks.  
In addition, three studies were commissioned in the early 2000s to review 
specific aspects of CG practice. The studies included the composition of the Boards 
themselves (to ensure increased independence), shareholder practice (to ensure 
appropriate attention is paid to minority shareholders in a business environment 
dominated by family owned and controlled businesses) and corporate reporting 
practice (to ensure appropriate transparency and to limit the movement of financial 
assets within cross-held companies). Results of implementation of the studies have 
been mixed. The major changes have been an increased implementation of the 
separation of the Chair of the Board and CEO and increased transparency of 
decision-making.
Based on a culture of respect for people in positions of authority (such as 
Chairmen of the Board or Directors), shareholder activism related to abuses of 
position or simple ineptitude has not been a traditionally active entity in Asia in 
general and Hong Kong in particular. This has resulted in some levels of abuse and 
a generally understood practice that minority shareholder interests not in line with 
the (generally single) majority shareholder could be ignored or, at a minimum, not 
fully actualized. To counter this practice, a private activist (Mr. David Webb) 
launched the Hong Kong Association of Minority Shareholders (HAMS) with a 
view to promoting shareholder activism in HK. The association plans to its own 
CG ratings on listed companies, represent minority shareholders as a group in 
companies’ annual meetings, and potentially take some of the worst CG cases to 
court. 
The movement represented by HAMS represents a “best practice” in 
relation to CG for both Hong Kong and other countries in the Region. The culture 
of family-controlled businesses across the Region may well resist any essential 
changes in requirements for transparency, accountability, and responsibility related 
to the governance of their corporate dealings. In a cultural environment, however, 
where  face  and  shame  represent   significant   elements   of   public   life,   the 
development of such association may well increase progress in areas related to 
positive CG practice.
In Hong Kong, shareholder activism has already appeared to have some 
effect on corporations like Jardine Matheson, where minority shareholder action 
forced some share buy-back actions that respond to shareholder dissatisfaction with 
financial returns and related Board decisions over the last several years.
The recent publication (2007) by CLSA of a comprehensive evaluation of 
CG practice has encouraged firms to both address issues of governance as a 
priority issue and to become increasingly transparent about their progress. In Hong 
Kong, Swire Pacific recently took the initiative of discussing their governance 
practices directly with CLSA in response to an earlier report. On the other hand, 
the Swire group had clearly taken the comments of earlier reports to heart and 
wanted word to be circulated about their progress. In this sense, the public 
documentation and corporate comparisons both within a country and regionally 
represent a significant positive influence on corporate governance progress in Asia.
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CLSA and similar organizations (McKinsey) who risk ridicule and attack 
for their high quality analysis and very public disclosure of findings deserve a large 
degree of credit for the promotion of modern CG practice in the Region. Given the 
Asian mindset, the practice of name and shame appears to be a more effective 
mechanism than praise for effective modern business practice. Higher valuations of 
stock along with better financial performance (the carrot part of the motivation 
equation) may not be too far behind as a driving motivator. Unfortunately these 
positive indicators associated with good CG practice tend to be more delayed in 
nature, while loss of face is both immediate and visceral in nature.
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Issues Indicative of the Potential Quality of Overall Corporate Governance (CG)
1
a. Discipline
o Explicit public statements placing priority on CG
o Management incented toward achievement of a higher share price
o Sticking to clearly defined core business
o Having an appropriate estimate of cost of equity
o Having an appropriate estimate of cost of capital
o Conservative approach to the issuance of stock or options
o Focus on and review of debt management processes
o Debt used only for projects within declared hurdle returns
o Return of excess cash to shareholders
o Discussion in Annual Report on CG
b. Transparency
o Disclosure of financial targets (3 and 5 year ROA/ROE)
o Timely release of Annual Reports, semi-annual financial announcements, 
and quarterly reports
o Prompt disclosure of results with no pre-release leakage
o Clear and informative results disclosure
o Accounts presented according to IGAAP
o Prompt disclosure of market-sensitive information
o Accessibility by investors to senior management
o Publicly accessible sources of Company data (Website, telephone hotline, 
Investor Relations Department) where announcements updated promptly
c. Independence
o Board and senior management relationship to shareholders
o Board and senior management relationship to stakeholders
o Chairman who is independent from management
o Executive management committee comprised of individuals different from 
Board membership
o Audit committee chaired by independent director
o Remuneration committee chaired by independent director
o Remuneration committee comprised on individuals not on Boards of other 
companies in related or associated sectors
o Nomination committee chaired by independent director
o External auditors unrelated to company
o Board having no members who are representatives of Banks or creditors
d. Accountability
o Board plays strategic directional rather than executive role
o Non-executive directors demonstrably independent
1 Modified from criteria developed by CLSA Emerging Markets Research Department (2001).
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o Foreign nationals presence on the Board
o Full Board meetings at least every quarter
o Board members able to exercise effective scrutiny
o Audit committee that nominates and reviews work of external auditors
o Audit committee that supervises internal audit and accounting procedures
e. Responsibility
o Record   on   taking   effective   action   against   individuals   who   have 
transgressed established policy and practice guidelines
o Record on taking measures in cases of mismanagement
o Measures to protect minority stakeholder interests
o Mechanisms to allow punishment of executive/management committee
o Share trading by Board members following declared policy and fully 
disclosed
o Board size large/small enough to be efficient and effective
f. Fairness
o Majority shareholder treatment of minority shareholders
o All equity holders having right to call general meeting 
o Voting methods easily accessible (e.g. through proxy voting)
o Information provided for general meetings clear, understandable, and 
complete
o Provision made to guide market expectations on fundamentals
o Issuance of ADRs or placement of shares fair to all shareholders
o Controlling shareholder group owning less than 40% of company
o Portfolio investors owning at least 20% of voting shares
o Priority given to investors relations
o Total Board remuneration rising no faster than new profits
o Board remuneration a mix of cash and options, with some Board members 
receiving only cash and some receiving only options
g. Social Awareness
o Explicit policy emphasizing strict ethical behavior (with demonstrable 
compliance)
o Avoidance of employment of child labour (with demonstrable compliance)
o Explicit equal employment policy (with demonstrable compliance)
o Adherence to specified industry guidelines on sourcing of materials
o Explicit   policy   on   environmental   responsibility   (with   demonstrable 
compliance)
o Abstention from business in countries where leaders lack social legitimacy 
(e.g. Myanmar)
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